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Case No. 14028 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs -
MIDWEST REALTY AND FINANCE, 
INC., a Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
oooOooo 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
oooOooo 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action seeking payment from 
the Defendant on a Promissory Note and an accounts receivable 
extension of credit. Plaintiff asserts liability on the part 
of the Defendant by reason of certain guarantys. (Exhibit P-3 
and P-ll.) Plaintiff alleges that there are separate con-
tinuing guarantys from Defendant to Plaintiff covering the 
Promissory Note and accounts receivable due Plaintiff from Lee 
Chair Corporation. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to 
pay the amount due on Plaintiff's demand after Lee Chair de-
faulted on its debts. Defendant asserts that there was only 
one continuing guaranty and that pursuant to the terms thereof, 
it was revoked by a letter from Defendant to Plaintiff dated 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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July 6, 1971, and that Defendant was not liable to Plaintiff 
for the debts incurred after that date. (Exhibit P-6.) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Judge J. E. 
Banks, presiding without jury, ruled in favor of the Plaintiff, 
requiring Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $59,000.00 principal on 
the Promissory Note dated February 4, 1972; $8,874.26 principal 
on the accounts receivable credit line; $5,000.00 attorney's fees; 
$236.48 costs of court; interest on the Promissory Note of February 
4, 1972, in the sum of $17,116.02; and interest on the accounts 
receivable credit line in the sum of $5,932.06, for a total sum 
of $96,158.82, plus 8% interest per annum from January 22, 1975, 
until paid. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ' 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and dismissal 
of the action in its entirety or in the alternative, for reversal J 
of the judgment with regard to all damages in excess of the \ 
$59,000.00 principal on the promissory note dated February 4, 
1972. j 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 4, 1970, Midwest Realty and Finance, Inc. j 
(hereafter "Defendant") executed and delivered to Wells Fargo j 
Bank (hereafter "Plaintiff" or "Bank") a Continuing Guaranty * 
prepared by Plaintiff to pay Plaintiff upon demand all indebted- 1 
ness of Lees Chair Corporation (hereafter "Lee") and Richard 
Maggs, its President, up to $60,000.00. (Exhibit P-3.) This J 
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guaranty authorized the bank to "renew, extend or accelerate 
the terms of the indebtedness. . .without notice or demand. . ." 
to the guarantor and allowed the Bank to "permit the indebted-
ness to exceed guarantor's liability." The guaranty also speci-
fically provided that: 
"This guaranty shall not apply to any indebted-
ness created after actual receipt by Bank of 
written notice of its revocation as to future 
transactions." 
On November 5f 1970, Plaintiff advanced to Lee the sum 
of $60,000.00. In December, 1970, it became evident that Lee 
needed more than $60,000.00 in credit. On December 17, 1970, 
Defendant executed and delivered to Plaintiff a continuing 
guaranty form prepared by Plaintiff in the amount of $130,000.00. 
(Exhibit P-11.) Plaintiff thereafter made additional advances 
of funds to Lee. The terms of this guaranty were identical 
to the form executed and delivered on November 4, 1970. 
The $60,000.00 debt was renewed on February 11, 1971. 
On July 6, 1971, a letter was mailed by Defendant to 
Plaintiff which stated in pertinent part that: 
"During the recent meeting of the Board of Direc-
tors of Midwest Realty and Finance, we reviewed 
our financial commitments. It was the decision 
of the Board that we will withdraw the "Continu-
ing Guaranty" of Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc. 
for and in behalf of L.E.E. Chair Corporation. 
This guaranty is dated December 17, 1970, and 
is in the amount of $130,000.00." 
"It is our desire that the guaranty be immedi-
ately reduced to the amount of the outstanding 
obligations covered by the L.E.E. Chair note. We 
believe this to be about $85,000.00." 
MWe would appreciate your earliest reply, indi-
cating any further requirements for finalizing this 
cancellation." (Exhibit P-6.) 
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Thereafter Wells Fargo Bank again renewed the $60,000.00 
debt on August 4, 1971, and September 22, 1971, (T.R. 34) On 
February 4, 1972, a new Promissory Note in the amount of 
$59^000.00 was executed by the president of Lee Chair, Richard 
Maggs, in favor of Plaintiff, evidenced by a Promissory Note 
bearing that date (Exhibit P-2). 
Contemporaneous with the Defendant's execution of the 
December 17, 1970 Guaranty, Lee executed a Continuing Security 
Agreement with the Plaintiff (Exhibit P-9) . It provided, inter 
alia, that: 
"Said security interest secures payment and per-
formance of: all present and future indebtedness 
of Debtor to Bank; all obligations of Debtor and 
rights of Bank under this agreement; and all pres-
ent and future obligations of Debtor to Bank of 
other kinds." (Paragraph 2.) 
* * * * * * * * * 
"In accordance with customary accounting prac-
tice, Bank shall credit to such Promissory Notes 
or enter in Debtor's Loan Account all payments 
made by the Debtor on account of indebtedness 
evidenced by such Promissory Notes on Loan 
Account, all proceeds of collateral which are 
finally paid to Bank at its own office in cash 
or solvent credits, and other appropriate debts 
and credits." (Paragraph 4.) 
* * * * * * * * * 
"While Debtor is not in default, Bank will, ex-
cept to the amount of contingent liabilities 
secured hereby, either release or apply to a 
debt secured hereby, at Bank's option, all sec-
urity in the form of cash or irrevocable bank 
credit. Any sums withheld to secure contingent 
liabilities may be deposited at Bank's option in 
a non-interest bearing account over which Debtor 
will have no control." (Paragraph 5.) 
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On July 6, 1971, the total credit extended from Plain-
tiff to Lee amounted to $91,672.97, plus interest. Plaintiff 
continued after July 6, 1971, to rewrite and extend credit to 
Lee in the amount of $280,931.90, while receiving monies in pay-
ment from Lee of approximately $272,057.64, leaving a balance 
owing on August 16, 1973, of $8,874.26. (Exhibit P-10.) 
Plaintiff, through Walt Winrow, responded to Defendant's 
letter of July 6, 1971, by contacting John Wells, a director of 
Defendant, by telephone. (T.R. 13) Wells was not an officer 
of the Defendant. (T.R. 7) Winrow and Wells discussed the out-
standing credit situations with regard to Midwest, Lee and 
Wells Fargo. From July 7, 1971 to September 21, 1972, no further 
action was taken with regard to the Continuing Guaranty. On 
September 21, 1972, Plaintiff wrote an information letter to Defen-
dant, stating that Plaintiff had continued to extend credit 
and advances to Lee. Plaintiff stated in the letter that it 
considered the guaranty to still be in force with regard to a 
$59,000.00 Promissory Note and the amounts outstanding on 
accounts receivable. Plaintiff made demand on Defendant to pay 
some $91,500.00 on February 8, 1973,, (Exhibit P-14) , and Plain-
tiff's attorney reiterated said demand on July 18, 1973, to 
which demands Defendant did not respond. 
Plaintiff then commenced this action on August 13, 1973. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CASE IS ONE IN EQUITY AND THIS COURT MAY REVIEW 
BOTH ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT. 
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The Plaintiff in this action seeks payment from the 
Defendant based upon certain "Continuing GuarantysM of a debt 
"incurred by Lee Chair* At issue is whether the first Continu-
ing Guaranty was superseded by the second one. This issue is 
primarily concerned with the terms of the agreements and the con-
duct of the parties in relation thereto. The Defendant asserts 
that the two are at odds with one another. 
Secondly, at issue is whether the Defendant cancelled 
the Continuing Guaranty. The Plaintiff maintains that it did 
not. The Defendant contends that it did. 
Closely related to this is the issue of the Plaintiff's 
handling and allocation of funds on the Lee account after notice 
of cancellation. The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff 
failed to act in good faith pursuant to the agreements of the 
parties and Lee. 
As such, this case deals in equity. This Court may 
therefore review both issues of law and fact. 
As set forth in McCullough v. Wasserback, 30 Utah 2d 
398, 518 P. 2d 691 (1974), this Court has consistently held 
that: 
In considering whether that standard of 
proof has been met we keep in mind that 
this is a case in equity in which this 
court may review the facts, yet do not 
lose sight of the prerogatives indulged 
the trial court; that even in equity cases 
his findings and judgment will not be dis-
turbed unless the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against them and a manifest in-
justice or inequity is wrought. But if 
these are seen to exist, this court may 
make its own findings and judgment to 
supersede those of the trial court. 
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It is the Court's prerogative and duty under the Consti-
tution to review the evidence in equity cases and to modify or 
make new findings if the record compels it. First Security Bank 
of Utah v. Demiris, 10 Utah 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 97 (1960). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY OF DECEMBER 17, 1970, SUPER-
SEDED THE CONTINUING GUARANTY OF NOVEMBER 4, 1970. 
The Defendant executed separate, identical forms pre-
pared by Plaintiff and bearing the heading "Continuing Guaranty," 
to secure the indebtedness of Lee Chair Corporation. The first 
was executed November 4, 1970, (Exhibit P-3), and the second was 
executed December 17, 1970 (Exhibit P-11). The first document 
was to guaranty indebtedness up to $60,000.00, which sums Plain-
tiff subsequently advanced to Lee. It later became evident that 
Lee required additional credit in excess of $60,000.00. The 
second Guaranty form (Exhibit P-11) was executed by the Defendant 
to secure liabilities up to $130,000.00. Contemporaneously, Lee 
executed the Continuing Security Agreement (Exhibit P-9). Plain-
tiff's total advancements to Lee never exceeded $95,000.00. 
The Continuing Guaranty Agreements state, inter alia, 
that: 
"(1) For valuable consideration, the under-
signed (hereinafter called Guarantors) jointly 
and severally unconditionally guarantee and 
promise to pay to WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., a 
California Corporation (hereinafter called 
Bank), or order, on demand in lawful money of 
the United States, any and all indebtedness 
of Lee Chair Corporation and Richard Maggs 
(hereinafter called Borrowers) to Bank." 
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The document dated November 4, 1970, states: 
"(2) The liability of Guarantors shall not 
exceed at any one time the sum of Sixty Thous-
and Dollars for principal, together with all 
interest on such part of the indebtedness as 
does not exceed aforesaid principal." 
The document dated December 17, 1970, states as above 
except the principal sum is "One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars" 
(2) goes on to state: 
"• . . .Notwithstanding the foregoing, Bank may 
permit the indebtedness of Borrowers to exceed 
Guarantors' liability. This is a continuing guar-
anty relating to any indebtedness, including 
that arising under successive transactions which 
shall either continue the indebtedness or from 
time to time renew it after it has been satisfied. 
This Guaranty shall not apply to any indebtedness 
created after actual receipt by Bank of written 
notice of its revocation as to future transactions. 
Any payment by Guarantors shall not reduce their 
maximum obligation hereunder, unless written notice 
to that effect be actually received by Bank at or 
prior to the time of such payment. The obligations 
of Guarantors hereunder shall be in addition to 
any obligations of Guarantors, or either of them, 
under any other guarantys of the indebtedness of 
Borrowers or any other persons heretofore given or 
hereafter to be given to Bank unless said other 
guarantys are expressly modified or revoked in 
writing; and this Guaranty shall not, unless ex-
pressly herein provided, affect or invalidate any 
such other guarantys. The liability of any 
Guarantor to Bank shall at all times be deemed to 
be the aggregate liability of said Guarantor under 
the terms of this Guaranty, and of any other 
guarantys heretofore or hereafter given by 
said Guarantor to Bank and not expressly re-
voked, modified or invalidated." (emphasis 
added) 
* * * * * * * * * 
"(4) Guarantors authorize Bank, without notice 
or demand and without affecting their liability 
hereunder, from time to time to (a) renew, 
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extendf accelerate or otherwise change the time 
for payment of, or otherwise change the terms of 
the indebtedness or any part thereof, including 
increase or decrease of the rate of interest 
thereon; (b) take and hold security for the pay-
ment of this Guaranty or the indebtedness guaran-
teed
 f and exchange, enforce, waive and release 
any such security; (c) apply such security and 
direct the order or manner of sale thereof as 
Bank in its discretion may determine; and (d) re-
lease or substitute any one or more of the endor-
sers or guarantors. Bank may without notice assign 
this Guaranty in whole or in part, (emphasis added) 
"(5) Guarantors waive any right to require Bank 
to (a) proceed against Borrowers; (b) proceed 
against or exhaust any security held from borrowers; 
or (c) pursue any other remedy in Bank's power what-
soever. Guarantors waive any defense arising by 
reason of any disability or other defense of 
Borrowers or by reason of the cessation from any 
cause whatsoever of the liability of Borrowers. 
Until all indebtedness of Borrowers to Bank shall 
have been paid in full, even though such indebted-
ness is in excess of Guarantors' liability hereunder, 
Guarantors shall have no right of subrogation, and 
waive any right to enforce any remedy which Bank 
now has or may hereafter have against Borrowers, 
and waive any benefit of, and any right to partici-
pate in any security now or hereafter held by Bank. 
Guarantors waive all presentments, demands for 
performance, notice of non-performance, protests, 
notices of protest, notices of dishonor, and notices 
of acceptance of this Guaranty and of the existence, 
creation, or incurring of new or additional indebt-
edness. " 
Certain provisions of the agreements as quoted above, 
when considered in context of the course of conduct of the 
parties, clearly indicate that they intended the second Guaranty 
to supersede the first. 
Paragraph (2) of the Continuing Guaranty form states: 
"The obligations of Guarantors hereunder shall be 
in addition to any obligations of Guarantors, or 
either of them, under any other guaranties of the 
indebtedness of Borrowers or any other persons 
- 9 -
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heretofore given or hereafter to be given to Bank 
unless said other guaranties are expressly modi-
fied or revoked in writing; and this Guaranty shall 
not, unless expressly herein provided, affect or 
invalidate any such other guaranties;. . . " 
However, the law is clear that the course of conduct 
of the parties to a written agreement can modify an express term 
of that agreement. In the case of Tucker Sales Corporation v. 
Potter, 104 Utah 1, 137 P.2d 270, 1943, the Court stated as 
follows with regard to the construction of a contract: 
"On the other hand, the court's construction is 
that given the contract by the parties themselves. 
From October 1, 1938, when the contract was enter-
ed into, until August 1941, almost three years, 
the partnership furnished plaintiff with duplicate 
slips and paid without question plaintiff's com-
mission on all coal sold. Appellants first raised 
this question on October 6, 1941. Nothing could 
show the intention of the parties more clearly 
than the interpretation they themselves place upon 
a contract. It is well settled in this state that 
where the parties to a contract, with full knowl-
edge of the terms thereof, by their actions before 
any controversy has arisen, place upon it a con-
struction which is not contrary to the usual 
meaning of the language used the courts will follow 
that construction. 
(See also Fowers v. Lawson, 56 Utah 420, 191 P. 227; Roberts 
v. Tuttle, 36 Utah 614, 105 P. 916; Titton v. Sterling Coal & 
Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77P. 758, 107 Am. St. Rep. 689; Snyder 
v. Fidelity Savings Association, 23 Utah 291, 64 P. 870; Woodward 
v. Edmonds, 20 Utah 118,57 P. 848; Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 
Utah 331, 40 P. 206.) 
In the case of Hodges Insurance Co., v. Swan Creek 
Canal Co., 111 Utah 405, 181 P.2d 217, 1947, the court stated: 
. in _ 
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"A practical construction of the terms of a con-
tract by the parties thereto implies a mutual and 
identical interpretation." 
The Court goes on to quote 17 C.J.S., "Contracts," 
Section 325, Subdivision 5, Page 765, as follows: 
"To warrant the court in according great weight / 
or adopting, a practical construction by the 
parties, it is necessary and sufficient that each 
party shall have placed the same construction on 
the contract. While the construction placed by 
one party on his own language in a contract is the 
highest evidence of his own intention, the meaning 
of the contract cannot be established by the con-
struction placed on it by one of the parties, un-
less such interpretation has been made to and 
relied on by the other party, or has been known to and 
acquiesced in by the other party,. . . . " 
In this case, both the parties put the same construc-
tion on the terms of the guaranty dated December 17, 1970, i.e. 
that guaranty superseded the guaranty of November 4, 1970. 
In the case of Builough v. Sims, 16 U.2d 304, 400 P.2d 
20, 1965, quoting the California Supreme Court, this Court said: 
"Appellants correctly claim that this doctrine of 
practical construction can only be applied when 
the contract is ambiguous, and cannot be used when 
the contract is unambiguous. That is undoubtedly 
a correct general statement of the law. (Citations 
omitted). But the question involved in such cases 
is ambiguous to whom? Words frequently mean dif-
ferent things to different people. Here the con-
tracting parties demonstrated by their actions 
that they knew what the words meant and were in-
tended to mean. Thus, even if it be assumed that 
the words standing alone might mean one thing to 
the members of this court, where the parties have 
demonstrated by their actions and performance 
that to them the contract meant something quite 
different, the meaning and intent of the parties 
should be enforced. In such a situation the 
parties by their actions have created the 
"ambiguity" required to bring the rule into oper-
ation. If this were not the rule the courts would 
be enforcing one contract when both parties have 
demonstrated that they meant and intended the con-
tract to be quite different." 
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(Subsequently restated in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 
U.2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 1972.) 
In the present action, there are ambiguities in the 
Guaranty Agreement when considered in light of the subsequent 
conduct of the parties. The law is that ambiguities be resolved 
against the maker of the instrument, or in cases in which the 
parties have put an interpretation on the ambiguity the court 
should apply the construction applied by the parties themselves. 
The parties both treated the debt and guaranty as if there was 
only one guaranty. Only upon commencement of this action has 
Plaintiff begun to refer to two guaranties. 
At the trial, G. R. Harmon, President of Defendant, 
testified that the guaranty of December 17, 1970, was intended 
to replace or supersede the first guaranty, and that Defendant 
never intended to be obligated for debts of Lee in excess of 
$130,000.00 (T.R. 64). The Security Agreement executed by Plain-
tiff and Lee (Exhibit P-9) and all of the letters between the 
parties, which are Exhibits P-6, P-8, P-13, and P-14, and the 
minutes of Defendant, (Exhibit P-l) , all show that both parties 
refer only to one continuing guaranty and rely only on one 
continuing guaranty between them. 
The continuing Security Agreement, executed between 
Plaintiff and Lee contemporaneous with the December 17, 1970, 
guaranty, on December 18, 1970, secures (Paragraph 2) "All pre-
sent and future indebtedness of Debtor (Lee) to Bank; all ob-
ligations of Debtor and rights of bank of other kinds." The 
- 12 -
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Security Agreement terminates (Paragraph 3) only "upon payment 
of all indebtedness and performance of all obligations existing 
when Bank receives written notice of withdrawal of this 
Agreement by Debtor." The Security Agreement treats all ob-
ligations of Lee (guaranteed by Defendant) as one liability, in-
cluding the $60,000.00 originally advanced and later advancements. 
Defendant's letter of July 6, 1971, to Plaintiff states: 
"During the recent meeting of the Board of Direc-
tors of Midwest Realty and Finance, we reviewed 
our financial commitments. It was the decision 
of the Board that we will withdraw the "Con-
tinuing Guaranty" of Midwest Realty and Finance, 
Inc. for an in behalf of L.E.E. Chair Corporation. 
This guaranty is dated December 17, 1970, and is 
in the amount of $130,000.00. 
"It is our desire that the guaranty be immediately 
reduced to the amount of the outstanding obliga-
tions covered by the L.E.E. Chair Note. We believe 
this to be about $85,000.00. 
"We would appreciate your earliest reply, in-
dicating any further requirements for finalizing 
this cancellation." 
This letter states unequivocably that the company will 
withdraw the continuing guaranty of Defendant for Lee, and then 
refers to that guaranty as dated December 17, 1970, and as being 
in the amount of $130,000.00. The letter refers to the guaranty 
in the singular and speaks of a single sum liability of 
$85,000.00. It is obvious that Defendant was referring to one 
guaranty as inclusive of the total debt. Indeed, this is the only 
reasonable interpretation that can be placed upon this language 
when one considers the knowledge of the Plaintiff as to the total 
indebtedness outstanding at the time. 
- 13 -
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Plaintiff's letter of September 21, 1972, to Defendant 
states that it is Plaintiff's position that Defendant's guaranty 
was still in effect. It speaks of one guaranty as follows: 
"In regard to your guarantee, I am enclosing a 
copy for your records in the event you might not 
have one. Our position, simply stated, is that * 
we have felt and continue to feel that you guaranteed 
these loans. As to your letter of July 6, 1971, 
we have discussed this with Mr. Winrow and he 
stated that according to his conversation with 
Mr. Wells, the intent of the letter was to 'cap' 
the borrowing which was done. We, therefore, 
contend that you in fact do guaranty Lee Chair's 
indebtedness to Wells Fargo Bank." (emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiff's letter of February 8, 1973 to Defendant 
is a demand letter for payment of Lee's indebtedness. (Exhibit 
P-14.) That letter states, inter alia, that: 
"At the present time, the following is owed by 
Lee Chair: 
Promissory Note $59,000.00 
Interest paid to February 25, 1972 
Accounts Receivable Financing $32,500.00 
Interest paid to March 25, 1972 
Obviously, further forebearance on the part of the 
bank is unfeasible. Therefore, we are making for-
mal request for payment of these obligations 
under the terms of the Continuing Guaranty you ex-
ecuted on December 17, 1970." (emphasis added) 
This letter clearly evidences that up until the insti-
tution of this action, the Plaintiff also treated the indebtedness 
of Lee as being covered by one guaranty, the one of December 17, 
1970. (Exhibit P-ll.) Only upon institution of this action did 
the Plaintiff apparently find it advantageous to treat the Lee 
indebtedness separately. 
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In addition to these letters, the Defendant's minutes 
of June 22, 1972, and of August 14, 1973 refer to only one 
guaranty of the debts of Lee from Defendant to Plaintiff. 
(Exhibit P-l.) 
It should also be noted that the Plaintiff's accounts 
card, (Exhibit P-10), from February, 1971, until July, 1971, 
illustrate that the accounts were guaranteed by a guaranty from 
Defendant dated December 17, 1970. After July, 1971, and re-
ceipt of Defendant's letter of cancellation (Exhibit P-6) 
Plaintiff no longer showed any guaranty on the accounts until 
May of 1972, when Plaintiff began to show a guaranty from 
R. Maggs of Lee Chair Company on its accounts. 
Plaintiff never in all its course of dealing with Lee 
and Defendant allowed the credit extended to Lee to exceed the 
$130,000.00 limits of the December 17, 1970 guaranty. In fact, 
it never exceeded $95,000.00 (T.R. 66). The course of conduct 
of Plaintiff as well as Defendant shows that both parties in-
tended that the guaranty of December 17, 1970, supersede the 
guaranty of November 4, 1970, and both parties acted in re-
liance upon that fact up until the time that this action was 
commenced. 
POINT III 
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY FROM DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF 
WAS REVOKED AS TO ALL FUTURE TRANSACTIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF 
CREDIT BY THE LETTER FROM DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF DATED JULY 6, 
1971. 
- 15 -
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The continuing guaranty form used by Plaintiff, which 
was executed by Defendant in the November 4, 1970, transaction 
and the December 17, 1970, transaction, states in Paragragh (2) 
that: 
"This guaranty shall not apply to any indebted-
ness created after the actual receipt by Bank 
of written notice of its revocation as to future 
transactions." 
The letter of July 6, 1971 (Exhibit P-6) from Defendant 
to Plaintiff states that: 
"During the recent meeting of the Board of Dir-
ectors of Midwest Realty & Finance, we reviewed 
our financial commitments. It was the decision 
of the Board that we will withdraw the 'Con-
tinuing Guaranty1 of Midwest Realty & Finance, 
Inc. for and in behalf of Lee Chair Corporation. 
This guaranty is dated December 17, 1970, and 
is in the amount of $130,000.00. 
"It is our desire that the guaranty be immedi-
ately reduced to the amount of the outstanding 
obligations covered by the Lee Chair note. We 
believe this to be about $85,000.00. 
"We would appreciate your earliest reply in-
dicating any further requirement for finalizing 
this cancellation. (Emphasis added) 
As of the date of this letter, Defendant was obligated 
to Plaintiff for the outstanding balance of credit extended to 
Lee pursuant to Defendant's continuing guaranty to Plaintiff. 
Defendant clearly stated that it was withdrawing and cancelling 
the continuing guaranty with regard to any transactions after 
the date of the letter. Defendant's cancellation was pursuant 
to and in accordance with the terms of the continuing guaranty 
executed by the parties. 
- 16 -
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Plaintiff made no official response to the letter of 
cancellation until September 21, 1972 when Plaintiff wrote an 
information letter to Defendant (Exhibit P-8) stating Plaintiff's 
position with regard to the guaranty as follows: 
"Lee Chair Corporation is presently indebted to * 
Wells Fargo Bank in the amount of $77,461.86. 
This is broken down as follows: $59,000.00 un-
secured note and $18,461.86 in the form of ac-
counts receivable financing. The accounts rec-
eivable line is still in effect so that balance 
may fluctuate. However, the maximum has been 
capped at $32,500.00. We have continued to 
allow this borrowing because if we cease to allow 
it, it would result in the closing of the busi-
ness, thereby eliminating any possibility of 
their repaying the other note. As you can see, 
the accounts receivable line is being used pro-
perly by Mr. Maggs. . . . " 
"Our position, simply stated is that we have 
felt and continue to feel that you guaranty 
these loans. As to your letter of July 6, 
1971, we have discussed this with Mr. Winrow 
and he stated that according to his conversa-
tion with Mr. Wells, the intent of the letter 
was to cap the borrowing which was done. We, 
therefore, contend that you in fact do guaranty 
Lee Chair's indebtedness to Wells Fargo Bank." 
In this letter and in the letter of February 8, 1973, 
Plaintiff attempts to explain why it continued to extend credit 
to Lee even though they had notice since July 6, 1971, of Defen-
dant's cancellation. In the letter of February 8, 1973, Plain-
tiff stated: 
"This company is in serious difficulty at the 
present time. We have allowed the Accounts Rec-
eivable line to remain open (maximum advance 
$32,500.00) in order to allow the company's 
continued operation and to assist Mr. Maggs in 
his attempts to find a solution to the firm's 
financial difficulties." 
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The explanations advanced to Defendant in these two 
letters indicate no reliance on the guaranty in extending this 
additional credit, and no prior notice to Defendant, but rather 
a business decision on the part of Plaintiff, for which Defendant 
should not be held responsible. This kind of business decision 
made on the part of Wells Fargo Bank should have no effect on 
the Continuing Guaranty entered into between Defendant and 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff continued to extend credit to Defendant 
without any written authorization of any kind. Further extension 
of credit after the cancellation letter of July 6, 1971 is be-
yond the obligation incurred by Defendant in executing the 
Continuing Guaranty of December 17, 1970 as set forth by the 
specific language of the Agreement, to-wit: 
"This guaranty shall not apply to any indebted-
ness created after actual receipt by Bank of 
written notice of its revocation as to future 
transactions" (Paragraph 2) 
The Bank acknowledges receipt of Defendant's letter of 
July 6, 1971, which states: 
" . . . .we will withdraw the 'Continuing 
Guaranty' of Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc. 
for and in behalf of Lee Chair Corporation." 
Plaintiff had notice of Defendant's cancellation pur-
suant to the terms of the guaranty, yet they continued to ex-
tend credit to Lee, Defendant is not liable for any such exten-
sion of credit after July 6, 1971. 
G. R. Harmon was the only party with authority to can-
cel or modify the cancellation pursuant to action of the Board 
of Directors of Defendant. The letter of cancellation was 
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signed by Mr. Harmon (Exhibit P-6) , and all agreements were signed 
by Mr. Harmon (Exhibits P-3 and P-ll). At the trial, Plaintiff 
introduced evidence that a director of the Defendant, John Wells, 
had authorized "capping the accounts receivable line at 
$35,000.00." That evidence, in the form of notes scribbled on a 
letter pursuant to a telephone conversation, was admitted as an 
exception to the heresy rule (T.R. 40). Defendant contends that 
the evidence was wrongfully admitted because they were not iden-
tified by the person who ostensibly took the notes, they were 
not taken in the regular course of business of the bank, and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation was not such as to 
indicate their trustworthiness. In addition there was insuffi-
cient foundation as to witnesses ability to recognize the writing. 
(T.R. 38-40) 
Finally, Wells, as a director of Defendant, had no authority 
to authorize "capping" of any credit extensions. Mr. Wells also 
testified that he did not authorize any such action (T.R. 17, 19). 
At 34 A.L.R. 2d 290, Authority Of Officers or Agent to Bind Corpora-
tion as Guarantor or Surety, states: 
"But individual directors have no authority 
even in connection with a contract authorized 
by vote of the board, to add a guaranty to it 
in order to facilitate its performance." 
19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, Section 1120, states: 
"As a consequence, a single director of a 
corporation as such has no power to act in a 
representative capacity for the corporation. .M 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Such was the case with regard to the telephone conver-
sation between Plaintiff's officer and John Wells. Plaintiff 
cannot rely on that conversation as any authority for its con-
tinued extension of credit to Lee being guaranteed by Defendant. 
This is especially true when Plaintiff had always dealt only 
with Harmon. Plaintiff knew Harmon was president and had auth-
ority to act for the Defendant. 
The conversation was the only evidence propounded by 
the Plaintiff to support its position that it was authorized by 
the Defendant to "cap" the guaranty rather than "cancell" the 
guaranty as called for in the Defendant's letter to the Plain-
tiff (Exhibit P-6). Even if one assumes that Mr. Wells did in-
dicate the intent was to "cap" the account, he clearly had no 
authority to act for the Defendant corporation and could not 
alter the terms of the letter. 
Thus, the lower Court's conclusions and findings in 
this regard constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal 
of its decision herein. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY CREDIT EXTENDED TO 
LEE BY PLAINTIFF AFTER JULY 6, 1971. 
After July 6, 1971f the Plaintiff extended funds to 
Lee Chair in the total amount of $280.931.90, and received from 
Lee monies in payment of those funds advanced of approximately 
$272,057.64, leaving a balance owing from Lee to Plaintiff on 
August 16, 1973, of $67,874.26 (Exhibits P-10 and P-16). Plain-
tiff claims that Defendant is liable for said debt. 
ti 
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38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty states: 
". . .the offer to guaranty future obligations 
may be revoked by the guarantor, at least in the 
absence of a contrary provision in the guaranty 
instrument, with the result that the guarantor 
will not be liable to the creditor on the latterfs 
extension of credit to the debtor subsequent to 
the receipt of notice of revocation." 
It should further be noted that: 
"Where a guaranty is continuing in character. . ., 
it may be withdrawn on notice and the guarantor 
will not be affected by any transaction between 
the principal obligor and the guaranty subsequent 
to the notice." (Duration of a Continuing 
Guaranty, 81 A.L.R. 795.) 
"A guaranty does not cover renewals, after re-
vocation of claims within coverage at the time 
of recovation." (Guaranty as Covering Renewals, 
After Revocation of Claims Within Coverage at 
Time of Revocation, 100 A.L.R. 1236.) 
The terms of the Continuing Guaranty itself (Exhibit 
P-ll) specifically provides that: 
"This Guaranty shall not apply to any indebted-
ness created after actual receipt by Bank by 
written notice of its revocation as to future 
transactions." (Paragraph 2) 
It is clear that sums substantially in excess of the 
amount outstanding on the date of cancellation were received 
and credited to Lee's account subsequent to that cancellation. 
It is also clear that the Plaintiff chose to advance additional 
funds to Lee in "future transactions". 
There was no agreement between Plaintiff and Defen-
dant to "cap" the accounts receivable financing between Lee 
and Plaintiff. Indeed no officer of Defendant corporation ever 
spoke with any employee or officer of Plaintiff corporation 
about capping of any financing between Lee and Plaintiff (T.R. 
17, 18, 19). 
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Plaintiff was on notice that Defendant would not 
guaranty any future transactions between Lee and Plaintiff as 
of July 6, 1971. In spite of this, Plaintiff continued to ad-
vance credit to Lee and receive payments from Lee without 
applying those payments to the total outstanding debt of Lee 
guaranteed by the Defendant, including the advance of $60,000,00. 
By so doing, Plaintiff failed to act in good faith with regard 
to the guarantor of the credit advanced to Lee between November 4, 
1970 and July 6, 1971. 
In the case of Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103 
Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906, 1943, the Court, in stating the rules of 
construction for letters of credit and guarantys, stated: 
"Giving rules for construction of letters of 
credit or guaranty, the court says in Marshall-
Wells Co. v. Tenncy, or guaranty are contracts 
of an extensive use in the commercial world, 
and upon the faith of which large credits and 
advances are made. A letter of credit should 
not receive a strict and technical interpreta-
tion, but a fair and reasonable one, according 
to the true import of its terms, and what may 
be fairly presumed to have been the intention 
and understanding of the parties , with a view to 
the furtherance of its spirit, and in order to 
attain the object designed. . . . " 
"In Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212 App. Div. 
25, 208 N.Y.S. 428,436, the Court construed to-
gether several different letters between the 
parties, and made a letter of credit out of them. 
Giving the rules of construction for contracts, 
as they are applied to letters of credit, the 
Court said: 'answer to the appellant's conten-
tion that, by taking the three letters. . . . 
together, the letter of credit was accepted 
by Lamborn & Co.. . .is found in the rule that 
the bank's writings must be taken most strongly 
against it, and must be construed so as to be 
reasonable and consistent, and their intent 
deemed to have been an honorable and honest one.' 
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(See also Doelger v. Battery Park Nat. Bank, 201 App. Div. 
515, 194 N.Y.S. 582? Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N.Y. 549, 
55 N.E. 292; Schneider v. Victor, 208 App. Div. 624, 203 N.Y.S. 
897.) 
Quoting from Gillet v. Bank of America, supra, the Court 
said: 
"If there is any uncertainty or ambiguity as to 
the meaning of the agreement, it should be resolved 
in favor of the Plaintiff, as it was the Defendant 
who prepared this contract. If there is any doubt 
as to the meaning of the terms employed, the Defen-
dant is responsible for it, as the language is 
wholly its own." 
Thus, in Powerine, supra, this Court required that the 
acts of the parties be deemed to be reasonable and honest and 
that the parties act in good faith with each other pursuant to 
a guaranty, and the Court indicated that in determining the in-
tent of the parties that reasonable and honest intentions be 
assumed. This would require Plaintiff to use the first in-first 
out accounting principles required by the language of the 
Continuing Security Agreement executed between Plaintiff and Lee 
(Exhibit P-9) which states: 
"In accordance with customary and accounting 
practice, Bank shall credit to such promissory 
notes or enter in Debtor's Loan Account all pay-
ments made by the Debtor on account in indebted-
ness evidenced by such promissory notes on Loan 
Account, all proceeds of collateral which are 
finally paid to Bank at its own office in cash 
or solvent credits, and other appropriate debits 
and credits." (Paragraph 4) 
Additionally, the Plaintiff specifically included in 
Paragraph (4) of the Continuing Guaranty (Exhibit P-ll) that: 
"Guarantors authorize Bank, without notice or de-
mand and without affecting their liability hereunder 
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from time to time to (a) renew, extend, ac-
celerate or otherwise change the time for pay-
ment of, or otherwise change the terms of the 
indebtedness or any part thereof, including 
increase or decrease of the rate of interest 
thereon; (b) take and hold security for the 
payment of this Guaranty or the indebtedness 
guaranteed, and exchange, enforce, waive and 
release any such security; (c) apply such sec-
urity and direct the order or manner of sale 
thereof as Bank in its discretion may deter-
mine; and (d) release or substitute any one or 
more of the endorsers of guarantors. Bank may 
without notice assign the Guaranty in whole or 
in part. (Emphasis added) 
It should again be noted that these two instruments 
were executed by Lee and the Defendant contemporaneously. When 
considered in light of these circumstances, the Plaintiff failed 
to make any good faith effort to apply funds received by virtue 
of the Continuing Security Agreement to the debt guaranteed by 
the Defendant regardless of the specific language of its 
Continuing Guaranty authorizing it to do so. 
After notice of the withdrawal of the continuing guar-
anty, Plaintiff was, in good faith, required to apply the 
payments made by Lee to its outstanding debt. Plaintiff made 
the decisions that Lee Chair Corporation would be better able to 
pay off the $60,000.00 note if they continued to extend credit 
on the accounts receivable line. Plaintiff should not be 
allowed to take such a course of action based on its business 
decision and at the same time hold Defendant to a guaranty which 
was cancelled as to future transactions as of July 6, 1971. 
After said notice, Plaintiff had a duty to Defendant to apply 
all receipts to payment of Leefs debts which were guaranteed by 
the Defendant. 
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POINT V 
IF THE COURT TREATS THE LEE OBLIGATIONS AS SEPARATE 
DEBTS, THEN THE DEFENDANT WOULD STILL BE ABSOLVED OF LIABILITY 
THEREON. 
In considering the promissory note (Exhibit P-2) 'it 
should be noted that this Court has held that whether or not a 
new note is given in payment of the original note, or simply as 
an extension of the earlier debt is "a question to be determined 
by ascertaining the intention of the parties as manifested by 
the facts and circumstances attending their transactions." 
(Gray v. Kappos, 90 Utah 300, 61 P.2d 613, 1936, and Interstate 
Trust Co. v. Headlund, 51 Utah 543, 171 P. 515, 1918.) In the 
instant case, Lee and Plaintiff in executing the new note for 
a sum less than the original $60,000.00 debt and Plaintiff by 
surrendering the original note, evidenced an intent that the 
new note was in payment of the old debt, and, since the execu-
tion of the new note was subsequent to Defendant's letter can-
celling the Continuing Guaranty, Defendant is not liable on that 
note. 
In Merchants National Bank v. Cressey, 164 Iowa 721, 
146 N.W. 761 (1914), where a guaranty was an issue which covered 
loans and advances, including renewals without notice and pro-
vided for termination of thirty days written notice, much the 
same as the guaranty in the instant case, it was held: 
"The guarantor was not liable on the renewal of 
the note executed before the notice was given, 
when the renewal was made more than thirty days 
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after the revocation, . .It cannot be said that 
this in any way lessened the right of the bank 
in its enforcement of the obligation against him, 
for with notice of his withdrawal it could yet 
rely upon the existing evidence of the indebted-
ness made before such notice. In accepting the 
renewal after such notice, it thereby elected 
to be bound by his notice of withdrawal, and is . 
presumed to have relied upon the security ex-
isting at the time of the renewal: (100 A.L.R. 
1237.) 
In Re; Kelly (1913) 73 Mich. 492, 139 N.W. 250, 
Annotated Cases (1914) 848, the Court held that: 
"Renewals of 90-day notes after revocation of 
guaranty even in the form of a demand note are 
not covered by the guaranty, even if the de-
mand note be regarded as a continuing security 
for a succession of notes to the payee." (100 
A.L.R. 1237) 
On February 4, 1972, Plaintiff and Lee executed a re-
newal note for the sum of $59,000.00. This created a new obliga-
tion not enforceable until May 4, 1972. In so acting to create 
a new obligation after notice and receipt of Defendant's letter 
of cancellation, Plaintiff relieved Defendant of its obligation 
under the continuing guaranty to guaranntee the debts 
this case, the original note was surrendered upon execution of 
the new note. In 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, Section 918, 
it states: 
"The surrender of the original note upon re-
ceiving a renewal has been held to indicate 
that the renewal note was accepted as payment 
or novation with intent to discharge the orig-
inal. . . . " 
In the annotation titled "Renewal Note as Discharging 
Original Obligation or Indebtedness," 52 A.L.R. 1416, it states 
that: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"It has been held in several jurisdictions 
that the delivery back of the original note is 
presumptive evidence that the renewal note is 
accepted as payment." 
With regard to the accounts receivable line of credit, 
counsel refers the Court to the arguments contained in Point III. 
The arguments contained therein clearly absolve the Defendant of 
liability on the account receivable line of credit. 
POINT VI 
IF THE COURT HOLDS THAT THE SECOND CONTINUING GUARANTY 
DID NOT SUPERSEDE THE FIRST CONTINUING GUARANTY AND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR THE DEBT EVIDENCED BY THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE, THEN THE DEFENDANT WOULD STILL BE ABSOLVED OF LIABILITY ON 
THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE LINE OF CREDIT. 
The Defendant cancelled the Continuing Guaranty 
Agreement of December 17, 1970 (Exhibit P-ll) by its letter of 
July 6, 1971 (Exhibit P-6). There is no competent evidence 
that there was any intent by the Defendant to do otherwise. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Continuing Guaranty Agreement 
(Exhibit P-ll) the liability of the Defendant would not be ex-
tended to future transactions after receipt of notice of can-
cellation. 
After receipt of this cancellation, the Plaintiff pro-
ceeded to extend additional credit to Lees as well as receive 
substantial amounts of funds which were credited to Lee's 
accounts receivable credit line (Exhibit P-10). 
The arguments contained in Point III clearly demonstrate 
to the Court that the amount finally left outstanding on the 
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accounts receivable line of credit was a sum which resulted 
from advances of credit after notice of cancellation of the 
Continuing Guaranty. By its terms, said Continuing Guaranty ab-
solved the Defendant from liability for this indebtedness of 
Lees. 
Therefore, the judgment of the lower Court against the 
Defendant should be reversed as it relates to the amounts out-
standing on the accounts receivable line of credit to Lee's. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower Court against the Defendant 
should be reversed and judgment entered for the Defendant dis-
missing Plaintiff's complaint no cause of action. 
The lower Court's ruling that the Defendant did not 
intend to cancel the Continuing Guaranty was not supported by a 
competent evidence. To the contrary, the evidence clearly 
demonstrated that the Defendant's letter of July 6, 1971, was 
a notice of cancellation pursuant to the terms of the Continuir 
Guaranty. Therefore, the subsequent transactions of credit 
extensions to Lees were not covered by any Guaranty from the 
Defendant. 
Alternatively, the judgment of the lower Court shoulc 
be reversed with regard to all damages in excess of the $59,00 
principal on the promissory note dated February 4, 1972. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN E. CONDER, ESQ. 
Nielsen, Conder, Hansen & Henriod 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT, ESQ. 
JOHN L. YOUNG, ESQ. 
Ninth Floor Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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